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Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
Lee Hornberger*
MORE THAN FOURTEEN THOUSAND WORKERS DIED as a result of
occupationally related accidents in 1970.1 This is more than
died in Vietnam during the same period.2 During the 1960's, more than
150,000 Americans died under similar conditions.3 This was in spite
of occupational safety and health legislation in most of the states.
4
Federal safety legislation in limited areas had failed to stem the fatal
tide in even those limited areas.5 It had become apparent that unless
a new comprehensive approach was used the worksite would become
even more deadly than the battlefield. The Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 19706 was the federal government's answer to this
continuing threat. This article will review the OSH Act and attempt
to predict its future effect upon American industry and employees.
Legislative History
The House
Hearings held by Congress in the late 1960's revealed the urgent
need for new safety and health legislation.7 As an answer to this now
apparent need, several bills were introduced in the House Education
and Labor Committee. 8 The most prominent of these, the Daniels'
Bill, 9 would have provided the Secretary of Labor with the authority
to promulgate standards, conduct investigations and hearings, and
establish an administrative appeals system within the Department of
Labor for aggrieved employers. This bill was reported out of the House
committee in March of 1970.10 Placing of both adjudicatory and en-
forcement powers in the hands of the Secretary of Labor provoked
much opposition."
*Of the Michigan Bar; B.A., J.D., University of Michigan.
1 SENATE COMMrTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCU-
PATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 142 (1971). [herein-
after cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]
'Id.
sSee generally SOMERS AND SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-7 (1954).
4 U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Occupational Health and Safety
Legislation (1970) ; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4101.02 et seq. (Page 1965).
6 Senator Muskie has pointed out: "Even in fields where strong Federal laws do exist,
such as coal mine health and safety, lack of enforcement has meant virtually no decline
in the accident and death rates." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 513.
6 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.
(1971).
7 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970 13 (1971).
8 H. R. 843, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) ; H. R. 3809, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) H. R.
4294, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H. R. 13373, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H. R.
16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
9 H. R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 84-6.
11 Id. at 877. Professor Davis has pointed out that one of the principal barriers to the
davelopment of administrative law has been the theory of the separation of powers.
See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 25 (1965).
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President Nixon reflected the views of many during his message
to Congress on August 6, 1969.12 While indicating his support for an
occupational safety and health act, he maintained that a better
approach would:
separate the function of setting safety and health standards
from the function of enforcing them. Appropriate procedures to
guarantee due process of law and the right to appeal will be
incorporated. 13
An administration bill had previously been rejected in the House
committee. This was largely because the Democratic majority felt that
the powers mentioned by the President should be united with the
Department of Labor. As would be discovered later, this view was
not shared on the floor of the House.
Another administration proposal,14 the Steiger-Sikes amendment,
was presented to the House as a substitute to the Committee bill. This
bill would have separated the enforcement and adjudicatory functions.
Most importantly, an independent commission would have been
established not only for review purposes of proposed penalties,15 but,
in addition, another independent commission would have been estab-
lished to promulgate standards.16 Such a "separation of powers" ap-
proach was just the opposite of that used in the Daniels bill. Under
the substitute amendment, the Secretary would have had only the
authority to investigate. He would not have had the authority to pro-
mulgate standards or the power to review employer appeals. The
Steiger-Sikes amendment was adopted by a vote of 220 to 172.1?
The Senate
Meanwhile the Senate's Labor and Public Welfare Committee
had witnessed the turmoil occurring in the House Committee. Appar-
ently the need for moderation and compromise was heeded. Senator
Williams introduced the prototype of the ultimate Senate bill in May
of 1969.18 An administration bill was submitted by Senator Javits the
following August.' 9 In September of 1970, the Williams bill was re-
ported out of the committee. 20
Reflecting the more liberal complexion of the Senate, a bill sim-
ilar to the Steiger-Sikes bill was rejected by a vote of 41 to 39 on the
Senate floor.2' Subsequently, administration-sponsored amendments
were adopted. These amendments substantially altered the provisions
12 21 BNA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REP. 141-142 (1971).
13 Id.
34 H, . 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
15 Id. at § 11.
16 (d. at § 8(a).
17 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1112.
18 S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
19 S. 2788, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
20 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 145.




concerning imminent danger and employer appeal rights.22 The Wil-
liams bill, as amended, was passed by a vote of 83 to 3 on November
17, 1970.23
The Conference Committee and Final Passage
A conference committee resolved the many differences which ex-
isted between the House Steiger-Sikes bill and the Senate Williams
bill. Several of the more important resolutions will be reviewed later
in the consideration of individual aspects of the OSH Act. The confer-
ence bill was adopted by the Senate on December 16, 1970,24 and by
the House one day later.25 President Nixon signed the bill into law
on December 29, 1970. After a long and sometimes bitter struggle, a
comprehensive safety and health act would become law on April 28,
1971.26 As will be seen, vast changes would be made upon the indus-
trial scene by this law. For the first time, a body of qualified experts
would be empowered to inspect worksites for unsafe conditions. Back-
ing them up would be enforcement and penalty mechanisms. Enforce-
ment of the OSH Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it
could become as comprehensive as that of the Fair Labor Standards
Act 27 provisions concerning minimum wage, overtime, and sex dis-
crimination.
Applicability
The OSH Act applies to all employers who have employees whose
business affects interstate commerce.28 Quite clearly the coverage of
this law is much broader than that of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The size of the business is irrelevant. Its type of activity is irrelevant.
As long as it has employees and does business that affects interstate
commerce, it must comply with the law's requirements. It is clear that
Congress intended to assert its jurisdiction over nonpublic employees
to the complete extent permitted by the Constitution. 29
Congress did exclude from coverage those employers whose work-
ing conditions were subject to standards enforced or promulgated by
any other Federal agency3 0 This would probably exclude those firms
which are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, who
exercises authority under either the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 196931 or the Federal Metal and Non-Metallic Mine
22 Id. at 478.
23 Id. at 528.
24 id. at 1150.
25 Id. at 1225.
26 BNA, tupra note 7, at V.
27 The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. (1964).
guarantees employers in industry covered by the Act compensation at a certain mini-
mum rate and at a premium rate for "over-time" work.
28 29 U.S.C.A. § 652 (Supp. 1971).
29 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1216.
3029 U.S.C.A. § 653(b) (1) (Supp. 1971).
3130 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
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Safety Act. 32 Congressional purpose for the latter was to authorize
the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate health and safety stand-
ards, inspect mines, enforce the standards, and, if necessary, close a
mine, require accident and related reports, and cooperate with state
agencies to develop state plans. This law applies to mines that are
not coal or lignite.33 "Mine" is broadly defined to include the land
from which the mineral is extracted, private transportation facilities
to such land, and all structures utilized in extracting material from
such land. The Secretary of the Interior is required to inspect all
covered mines at least once a year. 34 It seems that the investiga-
tive powers of the Secretary of the Interior are at least as broad as
those given to the Labor Department under the OSH Act. Mines that
are not covered by the above Mine Safety Act are covered by the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. This is a similar law
which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate safety
and health standards, conduct inspections and investigations of mine
working conditions, administratively close a mine if there is an im-
minent danger, and issue proposed citations and penalties. Unless the
Secretary of the Interior declines to assert jurisdiction, 35 it would
seem that at least nominally the mine workers are subject to a safety
act as comprehensive as the OSH Act. Nevertheless absent a complete
abstention by the Secretary of the Interior, it is clear that Congress
intended to preclude the Secretary of Labor from asserting jurisdic-
tion over employees subject to the above two laws.
This was pointed out by Congressman Daniels when he was re-
sponding to a question concerning a similar provision in the Daniels
bill. During the course of debate on his proposal, the question of
whether the new federal law would transfer safety jurisdiction to the
Secretary of Labor was raised. Daniels responded that:
... the answer is "No." [This section] would allow the Secre-
tary of Labor to assert jurisdiction over health and safety condi-
tions within the mining industry now subject to the Federal
Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Safety Act when the Secretary of
Interior has failed to exercise his statutory authority to set health
and safety standards or otherwise declines to assert any jurisdic-
tion over the mining industries under the Act. In other words,
only when the Secretary of Interior completely abrogates his
responsibilities under the Federal Metal and Non-Metallic Safety
Act would the Secretary of Labor be allowed to invoke [the OSH
Act] and set standards for the mining industries subject to the
Mine Safety Act.36
Therefore, it is clear that an employer whose mine is subject to
the Federal Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Safety Act or the Coal Mine
32 30 U.S.C.A. § 721 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
3330 U.S.C.A. § 721(b) (Supp. 1970).
3 30 U.S.C.A. § 723 (Supp. 1970).
35 30 U.S.C.A. § 722 (Supp. 1970).




Health and Safety Act is not subject to the Secretary of Labor's juris-
ditcion under the OSH Act.
The General Duty Clause
The- general duty clause of the OSH Act provides that:
Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment
and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to his employees.. ,'.36a
It has always been a nondelegable duty of an employer to furnish
his employees with a reasonably safe place to work, reasonably com-
petent and safe employees with whom to work, and reasonably safe
and suitable equipment with which to work.37 The majority of states
has passed laws to help .enforce these basic common laiw principles. 38
In addition, several federal laws have statutorily. implemented the
common law principle. For example, the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act provides that:
Every employer shall furnish and maintain employment and
places of employment which shall be reasonably safe for em-
ployees .... 9
Needless to say, there is a large body of law interpreting the com-
mon law, state, and federal requirements. To what extent can this
body of law be considered -in determining the requirements of the
OSH Act's general duty clause?
Congressional managers of the Daniels bill maintained that the
relationship of the clause was close to the common law. For example,
Congressman Perkins announced that:
The [House Education and Labor Committee] believes that
employers are equally bound by this general and common duty
to bring no adverse effect to the life and health of their employees
throughout the course of their employment. Employers have pri-
mary control of the work environment and should insure that it
is safe and healthful. [The general duty clause] merely restates
that each employer shall furnish this degree of care. There is a
long established statutory precedent in both Federal and state
law to require employers to provide a safe and healthful place of
employment. Over 36 states have these provisions, and at least
four Federal laws contain similar clauses .... 40
Similar thoughts were echoed by Senator Williams in the Senate com-
mittee report.41 These reports in both Houses used two reasons for
placing a general duty on employers to provide a reasonably safe place
of employment for their employees. First, such a duty was already
placed upon employers by prior common and statutory law. Second,
36a29 U.S.C.A. § 654(a) (1) (Supp. 1971).
37 See generally Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Jones, 294 F.2d 4-95 (5th Cir. 1961).
88 SOMERS AND SOMERS, supra note 3; see OHIO REv. CODE ANS. § 4101.11 (Page 1965).
39 33 U.S.C. § 941 (1964).
40 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 851.
41 Id. at 149.
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a general duty requirement was needed in order to enable the Secre-
tary of Labor to protect those employees who might be working under
conditions for which no standards have yet been promulgated.
4 2
Of course, the old common law concept of "duty" did not by itself
impose liability upon an employer or grant a right of recovery to an
employee. 43 Under the common law and most state laws, no such liabil-
ity existed until the failure to comply with the duty was the proximate
cause of a loss or injury. Congressman Steiger felt that this fact should
be considered in determining whether to enact a broad general duty
requirement. He stated:
Another argument offered in support of the committee bill's'
requirement is that it is comparable to the general duty of care
imposed by the law of torts. This argument is also unpersuasive.
Tort law is concerned with providing for after-the-fact payment
of damages by one whose negligent act caused the injury .... In
tort law the general duty of care does not exist in isolation. It is
surrounded by other factors which sharply limit it, and thus give
it real meaning and practical application in the field of law in
which it is used. 44
So actually the OSH Act's general duty clause imposed an addi-
tional duty on the employer. Henceforth he would be liable for his
negligently created unsafe employment conditions which have not
yet resulted in death or serious bodily harm.
Violations of the General Duty Clause
Civil penalties may be imposed upon employers who violate the
general duty clause.4 5 Whether to allow the imposition of such pen-
alties for violations of the general duty clause even if there was no
violation of an applicable standard was extensively discussed in Con-
gress. The general duty clause in the Daniels bill provided that:
Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment
and a place of employment which is safe and healthful.. .. 46
It was made clear by the Committee report on the Daniels bill that
a violation of the general duty clause would not have subjected the
employer to a mandatory penalty.47
Citations for violations of the general duty clause could have
been issued only if a "serious danger" existed.48 Under the House
committee bill, the Secretary of Labor would have been authorized
to assess a civil penalty of no more than one thousand dollars for
such a citation. It was intended that the general duty clause would
42 1d. at 150, 1217.
43 MALONE & PLANT, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-53 (1963).
44 LECISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 992.
45 29 U.S.C.A. § 666 (Supp. 1971).
46 H. &. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(1) (1970).





be used to protect those employees who might work under conditions
that are so unique that no standards have yet been promulgated.49
As noted previously, the House committee proposal was rejected
in favor of the Steiger-Sikes substitute amendment. The general duty
clause of this bill provided that:
Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees em-
ployment and a place of employment which are free from any
hazards which are readily apparent and are causing or likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees .... 50
The Secretary of Labor would have been authorized to issue a cita-
tion if he "believes that an employer has violated the requirements
of section . . .5 [which includes the general duty clause and safety
and health regulations promulgated by the Secretary] . . . ."51 This
was more comprehensive than the Daniels bill in that now a cita-
tion could have been issued for a general duty clause violation even
if it were not a serious violation. Furthermore, the penalty provisions
of the Steiger-Sikes bill did not differentiate between a citation
issued under the general duty clause and a citation issued for a viola-
tion of a promulgated safety and health regulation. In this respect at
least, the Steiger-Sikes bill would have increased the authority of the
Secretary rather than limited.
The general duty clause of the amended Williams bill as passed
by the Senate provided that:
Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees em-
ployment and a place of employment free from recognized haz-
ards so as to provide safe and healthful working conditions .... 52
Citations under the Senate bill would be authorized for violations of
both the general duty clause and promulgated standards. But a civil
penalty could not be assessed for an initial violation of the general
duty clause.
Any employer who violates any standard promulgated . . .
[by the Secretary of Labor] ... and has received a citation there-
for, shall be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $1,000....
Therefore, a citation could have been issued for a violation of the
general duty clause. This citation could have included an abatement
date. The employer could have been assessed civil penalties for failure
to comply with the abatement date.58 But there would have been no
penalty for the initial violation of the general duty requirement in
the Senate bill.54
The conference committee adopted the Steiger-Sikes approach.
In issuing a citation, it would make no difference whether there was
49 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, sutra note 1, at 852.
50 H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(a) (1970).
SlJ at § 10(a).
52S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1) (1969).3 Id at § 15(a).
54 LEGISLATIVE HisroRY, supra note 1, at 150.
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a violation of the general duty clause or a specific standard. Addi-
tionally, penalties could be issued for a violation of the OSH Act
regardless of whether it was a violation of the general duty clause
or a promulgated standard.55 It is interesting to note that the confer-
ence conunittee's report failed to recognize that there had even been
a difference between the House and Senate bills in this area.
As a result, it is clear that under the OSH Act an employer can
be cited and assessed a penalty for an initial as well as a continuing
violation of the general duty clause.
Safety And Health Standards
As noted previously,5 6 employers must comply with occupational
safety and health standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.
Such standards require conditions and practices necessary or appropri-
ate for a safe or healthful employment or place of employment.5 7
There are three different ways in which standards can become effec-
tive.
Some standards already in effect under certain other federal laws
and safety enforcement schemes remain in effect as OSH Act stand-
ards. These include those standards previously applicable to employers
subject to the Walsh-Healey Act,58 the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,59 and others.59a
In addition, the Secretary is authorized to promulgate standards
initially without regard to the rulemaking procedures of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.60 These standards must be put into effect
before April 28, 1973.61 Some commentators have described these as
"interim" standards.62 This description is not accurate. It must be
noted that once promulgated these "interim" standards are as perman-
ent as any other standard. The only difference between them and
those promulgated after a formal hearing is the procedure initially
used in their promulgation.
Of course, if he wishes, the Secretary of Labor may utilize the
formal procedures established in the OSH Act0 2a Additionally, there
will arise a need for modified or additional standards after April 28,
1973. At this point, the Secretary will be required to follow the pro-
55id. at 1154.
56 Id.
5729 U.S.C.A. § 652(8) (Supp. 1971). Broad delegation of rule making authority has
been found constitutional by the Supreme Court in similar circumstances. See generally
FCC v. RCA Communication, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
5SWalsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 41 U.S.C.A. § 35 et seq. (1964).
5933 U.S.C.A. § 901 ef seq. (1964).
59a Service Contract Act of 1965, 41 U.S.C.A. § 351 et seq. (1964) ; National Foundation
on Arts and Sciences Act, 20 U.S.C. 951 et seq. (1964).
6029 U.S.C.A. § 655(a) (Supp. 1971).
01 ld.
65 BNA, supra note 7, at 23.




cedure in the OSH Act which allows effected parties the right to par-
ticipate in a hearing. Subsequent to such a hearing, an aggrieved party
has the right to petition the Court of Appeals for review of the Sec-
retary's determination.63 This determination concerning the proposed
standard must be sustained by the court if it is supported by substan-
tial evidence in the record considered as a whole.
64
The standards which have been promulgated thus far effect
almost all employees in every area of their employment environ-
ment. 5 Some employers are seriously effected because of the inade-
quate enforcement of standards which have existed in the past. Others
who might be more seriously effected are small firms who have not
previously been subject to stringent laws with a determined admin-
istrative agency enforcing them.66
Investigations and Inspections
Constitutional Questions
Every major version of the Safety and Health Act authorized the
Secretary of Labor to enter a workplace and conduct inspections and
investigations. 67 The OSH Act allows a Compliance Officer 68 to enter
any workplace at reasonable hours without notice and delay in
order to inspect and investigate. 69
Two Supreme Court cases are pertinent here. The first concerned
the need for a search warrant when a municipal housing inspector is
conducting routine inspections for violations of the municipal health
code. In Camara v. Municipal Court,70 the Supreme Court held that a
warrant is required for a non-consent search of a residence under such
conditions. Two reasons were advanced for this. First, violations dis-
covered during the search could lead to the imposition of criminal
sanctions. Second, and probably more important, it was deemed
better policy for a magistrate to determine the authority of an
inspector. Such a prior determination would preclude the home
owner from having to guess the authority of the inspector. If he
assumes he has more authority than he actually has, an illegal search
occurs. If he underestimates the authority of the investigator and
refuses him entry, he runs the risk of going to jail. A similar result
was reached by the Court in See v. Seattle.71 In this case it was held
that the fourth amendment bars criminal prosecution of a person
6329 U.S.C.A. § 655(f) (Supp. 1971).
64Id. On the meaning of the substantive evidence rule see Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) and K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 29.02 (1959).
65 29 CFR §1910.1 el seq.
66 5 BNA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REP., 89 (1971).
67S. 2193 § 8(a); S. 4404 § 9(a); H. R. 16785 § 9(a); 11. R. 19200 § 9(a).
68 29 CFR § 1903.3.
6929 U.S.C.A. § 657(a) (Supp. 1971). See generally 29 CFR § 1903.
70 Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 397 U.S. 523 (1967).
71 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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who has refused to permit a warrantless search of his commercial
premises. This was based upon the ground that:
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a con-
stitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable
official entries upon his private commercial property.
71a
Based upon these two cases alone, it would seem clear that an em-
ployer has the constitutional right to refuse a warrantless search and
inspection by an OSH Compliance Officer.
That is, unless the more recent case of Wyman v. James72 limits
the application of the See doctrine. This case involved the right of a
mother who was receiving welfare payments to refuse a warrantless
home visit by a representative of the welfare bureau. Refusal of this
warrantless visit resulted in the termination of her welfare payments.
The majority of the court felt that denial of permission is not a crim-
inal act. There was no imposition of criminal sanctions for the refusal.
Also, even if it was a search, it was not unreasonable because the
investigator was actually more concerned with the welfare of the
child than any state of compliance of the mother. It was considered
that public funds are involved in the welfare system, no uniformed
police were involved, and a warrant, if obtained, would give more
authority than actually needed or desired. Does the reasoning of this
case allow a Department of Labor Compliance Officer to enter a com-
mercial establishment with neither consent nor a search warrant?
His intentions are to provide protection for the employee rather than
the employer. There are no uniformed police involved, and to a certain
degree there is a desire to establish or foster a working relationship
with the employee representatives. 73 Nevertheless, the investigatory
situation here is much closer to the Camara and See cases than the
fames case. An elaborate regulatory scheme has been established by
the federal government. Enforcement of this scheme is, at least in
part, done by the utilization of Compliance Officers who enter an
employer's establishment and investigate his operations and work-
place.74 Routine violations of the OSH Act by the employer will quite
frequently subject him to fairly large civil penalties. 75 It is entirely
feasible that the Compliance Officer could uncover a train of viola-
tions that could subject the employer to criminal penalties. 76 There-
fore, See interprets the fourth amendment so as to give the employer
the right to demand that the Compliance Officer obtain a search war-
rant. Of course, this would nullify the no-notice provisions of the law. 77
71, Id. at 543.
72 Wyman v. James, 91 S.Ct. 381 (1971).
7329 U.S.C.A. § 651 (Supp. 1971).
7429 U.S.C.A. § 657 (Supp. 1971).
7529 U.S.C.A. § 666 (Supp. 1971).
76 Id.
7729 U.S.C.A. § 667(8) (Supp. 1971).
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By refusing a warrantless search by a Compliance Officer, the em-
ployer has obtained time during which to eliminate at least the rec-
ognizable hazards.
Authorized Representative
The Daniels bill would have provided that:
A representative of the employer and a representative au-
thorized by his employees shall be given an opportunity to accom-
pany any person who is making an inspection .. . of any work-
place.78
This was substantially modified by the Steiger-Sikes proposal which
would have authorized an accompaniment right to an employee rep-
resentative only if the employer chose to accompany the Compliance
Officer.7 9
Representatives of both the employer and the employees would
have had the right to accompany the Compliance Officer in the Senate
bill.8 0 This approach was adopted by the conference committee.8 1
Therefore, an initial decision made by a Compliance Officer im-
mediately prior to his inspection is to determine who, if anyone, is
the authorized representative of the employees. The House and Sen-
ate laid this problem right in the Secretary's lap.
Congressman Perkins, in his report accompanying the Daniels
bill out of the House Committee, felt that:
Although questions may arise as to who would be considered
a duly authorized representative of employees, the Committee
expects the Secretary of Labor to determine this question by pro-
mulgating regulations to act as guidelines for an inspector.8 2
Senator Williams urged the same approach when he indicated in his
Senate Committee report that:
Although questions may arise as to who shall be considered
a duly authorized representative of employees, the Bill provides
the Secretary of Labor with authority to promulgate regulations
for resolving this question. Where the Secretary is not able to
determine the existence of any authorized representative of
employees . . . the inspector shall consult with a reasonable
number of employees concerning matters of health and safety in
the workplace. 83
In accordance with this legislative intent, the Secretary has pro-
mulgated regulations to help determine who, if anyone, is the author-
ized representative. The pertinent regulation provides that the Com-
pliance Officer will be in charge of the inspection and questioning of
persons.8 4 A representative of the employer and a representative
7 H. R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(e) (1970).
7 H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(b) (1970).
SOS. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(e) (1969).
81 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1190.
821d. at 852.
831d. at 151.
8429 CFR § 1903.6(a).
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of the employees will be afforded an opportunity to accompany the
Compliance Officer during his inspection. Furthermore, this will be
subject to the approval of the Compliance Officer.
Additionally,
In places of employment where groups of employees are
represented by different representatives, a different employee
representative for different phases of the inspection is acceptable
to the extent it does not interfere with the inspection.
Furthermore,
In the interest of affording all employees an opportunity to
be represented, more than one representative may accompany the
compliance officer during any phase of the inspection, if the com-
pliance officer so directs.84a
The latter phrase could cover two different fact situations. First,
where the workplace operations are complex and crafts are over-
lapping. This could occur on a construction site, shipbuilding yard,
or any other workplace where electricians, machinists, welders, and
other employees would all be mingled together in the same area.
Common sense and coordination would permit the Compliance Offi-
cer to settle this problem. But a second and more complicated situa-
tion arises where there is a jurisdictional dispute between two com-
peting unions or where there is as of yet no recognized union. In the
latter case, there might very well be a small but vocal neophyte organ-
ization claiming to represent the employees. The advent of the Depart-
ment of Labor's Compliance Officer could create a stage for all types
of activity. Does the regulation quoted above authorize the Com-
pliance Officer to select a representative from each of the competing
factions to accompany him on his inspection? A careful reading of
the regulations would indicate not. The pertinent provision provides
that:
In those cases where there is no authorized employee repre-
sentative, the compliance officer shall consult with a reasonable
number of employees concerning matters of safety and health in
the workplace.85
The use of the term "authorized employee representative" is
crucial. Officials of two or more competing factions, neither of which
has been recognized as the collective bargaining agent, probably
would not be an "authorized" representative. "Authorized employee
representative" has been defined in another context by the Secretary
to mean:
A labor organization certified by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board as a bargaining representative for the effected em-
ployees. In the absence of certification, it shall be the organization
which has a collective bargaining relationship with the employer.
If no labor organization has been certified or has such a collective
bargaining relationship . . . [it] shall mean any person or per-
84a 29 CFR § 1903.8.




sons designated by the affected employees to represent them for
the purposes of proceeding under this Act.8 6
Of course, in the context pertinent to this discussion, the Com-
pliance Officer would not seek to determine who was the authorized
representative if there are two non-recognized disputing factions. The
above regulation would clarify the Compliance Officer's quest where
there is a prior certification or collective bargaining agreement.
Where there is neither an agreement nor certification but there are
competing factions, he would be better advised to simply consult with
a reasonable number of employees.
Employee Time Spent In The Course Of The Investigation
The question now arises as to whether an employer can refuse to
pay an employee his regular rate of pay for that time during which
the employee accompanied the Compliance Officer during the inspec-
tion or was questioned by the officer as a representative of the em-
ployees. Neither the OSH Act, legislative history, nor the regulations
direct themselves to a solution of this problem. Of course, the inspec-
tion procedures:
shall be implemented so as to avoid any undue and unneces-
sary disruption of the normal operations of the employer's plant.8 7
Collective bargaining agreements could provide a solution in
those instances where the plant is well organized.87a The Compliance
Officer would usually select the shop steward as the authorized rep-
resentative. Some collective bargaining agreements would specific-
ally allow the steward to do a certain amount of such activity on
company time. Indeed that might be his major function in helping
to maintain harmonious labor relations in the plant.
However, the major problem will arise where the bargaining
agreement is silent on this point or where there is no such agreement.
The Act provides that an employer cannot discriminate against an
employee for the reason of the employee availing himself of his rights
under the Act.88 Several rights are provided to employees. One of
these is the right, under prescribed conditions, to accompany the
Compliance Officer during the inspection. Another such right is that
of being consulted about safety and health conditions in the plant. To
be effective this inspection and consultation almost have to be done
during working hours. Indeed it is mandatory that the inspection be
conducted "during working hours and at other reasonable times
.. . ,"8 To permit an employer to decline payment to an employee
for those minutes or, at most, couple of hours he spends in consulta-
tion with the Compliance Officer would have a chilling effect on
employee cooperation with the officer. Where the amount of such
s6 29 CFR 9 2200.1(f).
8 29 CFR § 1903.6(c).
8829 U.S.C.A. § 660(c) (1) (Supp. 1971).
8929 U.S.C.A. § 667(a) (2) (Supp. 1971).
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time is reasonable and directly incident to the inspection, it would
clearly be an employer discrimination violation to refuse to pay an
employee who has been consulted by the Compliance Officer. There-
fore, an employer cannot legally refuse to pay an employee for that
period of time that he has been involved in an investigation.
Enforcement
The first step in the enforcement procedures is the inspection of
the worksite. This step has been considered earlier along with some
of the pertinent questions raised. 90
If the Secretary of Labor, upon investigation, "believes" there
has been a violation of the general duty clause or a promulgated
standard, he will issue a citation to the employer.91 This citation must
be issued with "reasonable promptness" 92 at the least and within six
months of the alleged violation at most. 93 It must be in writing and
describe with particularity the alleged violation. In addition, the cita-
tion will propose an abatement date. The unsafe condition must be
eliminated within this proposed abatement period.
9 4
Upon receiving the notice of citation and proposed abatement
period, the employer has fifteen working days in which to file a notice
of contest with the Secretary.95 Regulations promulgated by the
Secretary have defined "working days" as the five regular work days
of the week.96 Since weekends and the day of receiving the citation
are not included, the employer will usually have at least twenty cal-
endar days in which to file his notice of contest.
The Secretary could notify the employer of any proposed penalty
in a second notification. There would again be fifteen working days
for filing a notice of contest of the proposed penalty. Apparently the
Secretary is authorized to follow the practice of notifying the em-
ployer of the citation and proposed abatement period in one initial
letter and then subsequently to notify him of the proposed penalty
in a second letter. Consequently, there would be two different fifteen
day waiting periods involved. It is possible that an employer would
be placed in a position of having to decide whether to contest a cita-
tion without knowing what the proposed penalty will be. Experience
has shown though that the Department of Labor is apparently noti-
fying the employer of the citation, abatement period, and proposed
90 See text at nn. 67-85 supra.
9129 U.S.C.A. § 658(a) (Supp. 1971).
9229 U.S.C.A. § 658(b) (Supp. 1971).
9329 U.S.C.A. § 658(c) (Supp. 1971).
9429 U.S.C.A. § 659(b) (Supp. 1971).
5 The employer is required to post the citation. See 29 CFR § 1903.16.
96 29 CFR § 1903.21 (c) provides that: "'Working days' means Mondays through Fridays
but shall not include Saturdays, Sundays, or Federal holidays. In computing 15 working
days, the day of receipt of any notice shall not be included, and the last day of the 15




penalty in the same letter. Upon receiving this notification of all three
elements, the employer can file a notice of contest to the citation, the
abatement period, the proposed penalty, or any combination of the
three.9 7
An employee or representative of employees can file a notice of
contest concerning the proposed elimination period.98 This would occur
when such party feels that the proposed elimination period for the
unsafe condition is too long. Such a notice of contest must also be
filed within fifteen working days.
Under the Daniels bill, the Secretary would have had to notify
the employer of a proposed citation within ten days after the inspec-
tion.99 The employer would then have had fifteen working days in
which to file a notice of contest. Once such a notice was filed, it would
have been required that "the Secretary of Labor shall afford an
opportunity for a hearing."'100 In this case, the Secretary would have
held his own hearing to determine whether or not to affirm, modify,
or vacate his own decision.10 Subsequently, the employer would have
had the right to appeal the Secretary's determination to the applicable
Federal District Court. This internal enforcement and appeals pro-
cedure was rejected by the House and Senate in favor of a separation
of powers approach.10 2
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Upon receiving a notice of contest, the Secretary will immediately
transmit the notice and citation to the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission. 10 3
A Safety and Health Appeals Commission would have been estab-
lished under the Steiger-Sikes substitute amendment. 04 As in the
conference bill, the employer would have had fifteen working days
in which to file a notice of contest. 10 5 Such notice would have been
referred to the Appeals Commission which would have afforded an
opportunity for a hearing.1" 6
The Williams bill in the Senate would have provided for an
appeal to be heard by a hearing examiner appointed by the Secretary
of Labor. 10 7 This procedure, of course, was similar to that which would
have been followed under the Daniels bill. Senator Javits proposed
9 See 29 CFR §§ 1903.17 and 2200.7(b).
98 id.
99H. R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 11(a) (1970).
100 Id. at § 11(b).
101 Id.
102 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1112.
10329 CFR 2200.7(c) (2).
104 H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1970).
105 1d. at § 10(d).
106 Id.
107 S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a) (1) (1969) ; See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 11-12.
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an amendment to the Williams bill. This amendment which was
adopted on the Senate floor provided for the establishment of an
Occupational Safety and Health Review Conmmission.' 0
8
It was left to the conference committee to resolve further differ-
ences between the House and Senate bills. The House bill provided
that a citation must be issued within 90 days of violation. 109 No
limitations at all were specified in the Senate bill. A six-month
statute of limitations was provided in the final bill.110 Unlike the
House proposal, the Senate bill allowed an employee or employee
representative to file a notice of contest of a proposed abatement
period.1 1' This right was preserved in the final bill.112
Furthermore, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission was established as a three-man commission with its head-
quarters in Washington."' Its members are appointed by the Pres-
ident by and with the consent of the Senate.114 Although specific
qualifications for membership were not outlined in the OSH Act, it
was felt that the need for advice and consent by the Senate would
assure the appointment of qualified and experienced personnel.
Hearings held by the Commission will either be in Washington
or, if deemed convenient, in the field.115 One of the three members will
be appointed Chairman by the President.
This Chairman will be responsible for the administrative opera-
tions of the Commission. Hearing examiners and other needed per-
sonnel will be appointed by the Commission, and the provisions of
section 11 of the National Labor Relations Act are applicable to the
jurisdiction and powers of the Commission. 116
Determinations of the hearing examiners will become a final
order of the Commission within thirty days unless the Commission
requests a review." 7 A petition for review must be filed within five
days. Nevertheless, the Commission upon motion of one of its mem-
108 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 81; Senator Javits originally designated this
commission as The Occupational Safety and Health Review Panel.
109 H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(c) (1970) provided: "The Secretary shall issue
each citation within forty-five days from the concurrence of the alleged violation but
for good cause the Secretary may extend such period up to a maximum of ninety days
from such occurrence."
11029 U.S.C.A. § 658(c) (Supp. 1971).
"I Id.
11229 U.S.C.A. § 661 (e) (Supp. 1971).
11329 U.S.C.A. § 661 (a) (b) (c) (Supp. 1971).
114 Id.
11529 U.S.C.A. § 661(c) (Supp. 1971).
11629 U.S.C.A. § 661(h) (Supp. 1971). Section 11 of the National Labor Relations Act
provides the NLRB with various powers needed to fulfill its investigatory and quasi-
judicial functions. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 161 (1964).
1 29 U.S.C.A. § 661(i) (Supp. 1971); 29 CFR 2200.42(c); See generally K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 184 (1965).




bers can certify an hearing examiner's decision within thirty days
for review.119
Final decisions of the Commission can be appealed by any "ad-
versely or aggrieved" party within sixty days. 12 0 This appeal can be
made either to the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia, the
site of the original violation, or the principal office of the employer.'
2
'
The substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole will
be followed by the Court of Appeals in determining whether to
affirm, modify, or vacate the Commission's ruling.
2 2
Discrimination Against Employees
The pertinent section of the OSH Act provides that:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate
against any employee because such employee has filed any com-
plaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding
under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to
testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such
employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by
this chapter. 22
These limitations on employer discriminatory activity are similar
to those in the Fair Labor Standards Act.124 Since the provisions are
similar, inquiry as to the judicial construction of the latter provision
would be beneficial.
An initial question which may arise is whether an employer can
legally discharge an employee who has complained to him about
unsafe conditions at the worksite but has not in any way filed a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor.
Courts have consistently refused to find a violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act where the employee has not been involved in
one of the specifically protected activities. For example, a court has
refused to enjoin the discharge of an employee even though it felt
inclined to think that probably the activities of [the em-
ployee]'s wife with the C.I.O. and her union activities, and the
fact that [he] was probably agitating something under the Wage
and Hour Law, possibly had more to do with his being fired than
the fact that these records were missing.125
Another court concluded in dicta that it would be unreasonable
to allow the discharge of an employee who had the courtesy to write
a letter to his employer concerning a wage and hour complaint even
though such employer would have been protected had he complained
11929 CFR 2200.42(d).
12029 U.S.C.A. § 660(a) (Supp. 1971).
121 Id.
122 id.
12129 U.S.C.A. § 660(c) (1) (Supp. 1971).
12429 U.S.C.A. § 215(a) (3) (Supp. 1971) provides that: [It shall be unlawful for any
person] to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee be-
cause such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted
any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify
in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.
125 Fleming v. Stillman, 48 F. Supp. 609 (D.C. Tenn. 1943).
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first to the Department of Labor. 126 This opinion expanded the defini-
tion of the term "file" to include a preliminary letter to the employer.
But it should be emphasized that the employee's activities were also
protected for the alternate reason that there was an independent
Wage and Hour Division investigation in process during this period.
The interrelationship of the demand on the employer and the con-
current investigation cannot be ignored.
Therefore, the law is clear that the discrimination clause of the
Fair Labor Standards Act
was intended to protect those employees who have made a
positive and overt act within the language of the statute, and that
some positive action on the part of an employee is mandatory
127
A mere demand for back wages to the employer is not such a positive
and overt act. Consequently, if the OSH Act's anti-discrimination
clause is interpreted in the same manner as that of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the employee's actions are not protected.
The protection provisions of the OSH Act are broader than those
of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The last phrase of the former law's
protection clause protects an employee from the employer "because
of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of
any right afforded by this Act. '128 These rights afforded by the OSH
Act must be other than those of filing a complaint, instituting a suit,
or providing testimony. Otherwise there would have been no reason
for Congress to have added this last phrase to the antidiscrimination
provisions of the law.
What are these other rights? It was the purpose of Congress to
provide
that employers and employees have separate but dependent
responsibilities and rights with respect to achieving safe and
healthful working conditions. 129
The employer has a duty to provide a place of employment that com-
plies with regulations and which is free from recognized hazards.130
It seems apparent that an employee has a right to such a place of
employment. The first three phrases of the antidiscrimination clause
protect specified procedural activities of employees. The broader pro-
visions of the fourth phrase would protect him in trying to obtain
enforcement of rights guaranteed to him by the law. These rights
stem from the obligations imposed upon an employer to provide a
safe and healthful place of employment.
126 Goldberg v. Zenger dba Intermountain Appliance Co., 43 CCH L.C. § 31, 155 (D.C.
Utah 1961).
127 Wirtz v. Valentine Lumber Co., 236 F. Supp. 616 (D.C.S.C. 1964).
12829 U.S.C.A. § 660(c) (1) (Supp. 1971).
12929 U.S.C.A. § 651(b) (Supp. 1971).




Furthermore, Congress intended to achieve safe and healthful
working conditions by two means: first, the enforcement provisions
of the law and second, by encouraging employers and employees to
work together "to institute new and to perfect existing programs
. ... "131 Senator Williams pointed out that:
It has been made clear to the committee that the most suc-
cessful plant safety programs are those which emphasize em-
ployee participation in their formulation and administration;
every effort should be made to maximize such participation
throughout industry' 32
This effort would be seriously compromised if an employee could be
dismissed solely because he pointed out health and safety defects to
his employer.
Therefore, an employer cannot legally discharge an employee
who complains to him about unhealthy or dangerous working condi-
tions at his place of employment.
Inminent Dangers
Legislative History
Procedures to be used in counteracting imminent dangers created
one of the major controversies during Congressional debate on the
various safety bills. An imminent danger was generally agreed to
include a condition that could reasonably be expected to cause death
or serious injury before utilization of the regular enforcement pro-
cedures could eliminate the unsafe condition.133 Such conditions could
include oil fumes, oil slicks, leaky pipes, noxious fumes, and others.13 4
Questions arose as to who should initially determine whether an
"imminent danger" condition existed. Furthermore, once an imminent
danger was determined to exist, who could issue an order closing the
work area while the unsafe condition is being eliminated. 136
The Daniels bill provided that both of these determinations would
have been made by the Secretary of Labor, who would have been
authorized to issue an administrative order closing a workplace for
as long as five days.13 7 During this five day period, the Secretary
would have been authorized to bring a civil action in the District
11 29 U.S.C.A. § 651(b) (1) (Supp. 1971).
132 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, suPra note 1, at 150.
133 S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a) (2) (1969) ; S. 4404, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(a)
(1970) ; H. R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(a) (1970) ; H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. § 12(a) (1970).
134 See Senator Saxbe's comments at 116 Cong. Rec. S. 18336, Nov. 17, 1970.
135 LEGISLATIVE HisToRy, suPra note 1, at 885.
136 Id. at 836. For the constitutionality of a temporary administrative closing order issued
without a proper hearing see Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594
(1950) ; it is noteworthy that the collective bargaining agreement of the Pacific Coast
Longshoring Contract Document, 1966-71, § 11, provides: "Longshoremen shall not be
required to work when in good faith they believe that to do so is to immediately
endanger health and safety." See Fairley, Area Arbitration in the West Coast Long-
shore Industry, 22 LAn. L. J. 566, 572 (1971).
87 H. R. 16758, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 12(a) (1970).
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Court seeking an injunction to have the unsafe worksite permanently
closed.' 38
This administrative approach was rejected in the Steiger-Sikes
bill. 39 Instead, the Secretary would have had no authority to close
any worksite with an administrative order.140 A temporary restraining
order from a District Court would have been required for this.
Before such a judicial order could have been in effect for more than
five days, a full judicial hearing would have been required."'
A compromise approach was used in the Senate bill. This bill
would have authorized the Secretary to bring a suit in the District
Court seeking a temporary restraining order.14 2 In addition, the Sec-
retary would have been authorized to issue an administrative shut-
down order where there was insufficient time to seek a judicial
decree.143 This order would have been effective for no longer than
seventy-two hours.
Consequently, the conference committee was faced with a major
difference between the House and Senate bills. The House bill did
not permit any administrative closing orders while the Senate bill
allowed a temporary seventy-two hour one. The conference committee
decided that the final bill would authorize no administrative shutdown
orders whatsoever. 44
Expedited Procedures
The Secretary is authorized to request a preliminary injunction
from a Federal District Court where the unsafe condition "can[not]
be eilminated through the enforcement procedures otherwise pro-
vided" by the OSH Act.1 45 Therefore, such an injunction cannot be
granted in those instances where utilization of the normal enforcement
procedures of the Act would eliminate the condition as rapidly as
a court order.
Consequently, it is important to note that the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission has promulgated expedited
procedures which allow for a rapid determination of issues in extra-
ordinary circumstances. 46 A hearing can be ordered with only twenty-
four hours notice to the concerned parties.147 The examiner is author-
ized to issue an oral order immediately after the hearing and all
pleadings can be done orally. This procedure presumably could permit
1281d. at § 12(b).
139 H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
140 1d. at § 12.
1411d. at § 12(b).
142 S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(a) (1969).
143Id., § 12(b).
144 29 U.S.C.A. § 662 (Supp. 1971).
14529 U.S.C.A. § 662(a) (Supp. 1971).
146 29 CFR § 2200.6 (f).




an initial determination within twenty-four hours of the employer's
notice of contest. 1
48
Penalties
Penalties can be imposed upon employers who violate the pro-
visions of the OSH Act.149 Willful or repeated violations of either the
general duty clause or applicable regulations can subject the em-
ployer to a $10,000 civil penalty for each violation. 150 Of course, a suit
under this section requires a showing that the alleged violations were
either willful or repeated.
Similar guidelines should be used in determining willfullness
under the OSH Act as have been followed under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.151 Therefore, whether the employer had knowledge
of the applicable regulation becomes relevant. But, of course, "evil
intent" is not required. The term "willful" means only that the act
or omission was done voluntarily or consciously. The issue is whether
the act was:
deliberate, voluntary, or intentional as distinguished from
one committed through inadvertence, accident, or by ordinary
negligence.152
In determining whether a violation is repeated, the results of
prior investigations can be considered. The present law became effec-
tive on April 28, 1971,153 and standards promulgated under it became
effective in most instances either immediately, 54 August 27, 1971, or
February 15, 1972.155 Situations have arisen where employers have
violated Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
regulations before April, 1971, and subsequent to the OSH Act's effec-
tive date, violated the very same regulation as an OSH Act regula-
tion.156 Has there been a "repeated" violation of the regulation which
could subject the employer to a $10,000 fine? The penalty provisions
speak of violations of the requirements of the Act. 157 But as to em-
14829 CFR § 2200.6(f) (3).
'4 29 U.S.C.A. § 666 (Supp. 1971).
15029 U.S.C.A. § 666(a) (Supp. 1971).
15129 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. (1964); Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 251 et
jeq. at 225(a) (1964).
152Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478 at 4-80, cert. den. 342 U.S. 876 (1951).
153 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1259.
15429 U.S.C.A. § 655(a) (Supp. 1971).
155 29 CFR § 1910 et seq.
156 Hodgson v. American Shipbuilding Co., O.S.H.R.C. Docket No. 70 (1971); Plain
Dealer, Sept. 15, 1971, at 1, col. 4. The Shipbuilding Regulations, 29 CFR 1502 et seq.,
were allegedly violated in this case.
15729 U.S.C.A. § 666(a) (Supp. 1971) provides that: "Any employer who willfully or
repeatedly violates the requirements of section 654 of this Act, any standard, rule, or
other order promulgated pursuant to section 655 or this title, or regulations prescribed
pursuant to this Act, may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each
violation." Other sections provide that a civil penalty of up to $1,000 "will" be assessed
for a serious violation and "may" be assessed for a non-serious violation. 29 U.S.C.A.
9 29(6) and (c) (Supp. 1971).
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ployees previously covered under the Walsh-Healey Act, the require-
ments are the same. They were incorporated under OHSA jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 4(a) (2) of the Act. 158 Effective enforcement of
both the OSH Act and the prior safety act would be seriously thwarted
if employers who had previously violated safety regulations are
allowed to start with a "clean slate" under the OSH Act.
Each of the penalty sections provide that civil penalties can be
assessed. 15 9 How many violations can the Secretary find in a work-
place and what criteria can be used to define or limit a violation?
It is clear that a separate violation can be alleged for a failure to
provide guards on separate machines. 1 0 But what occurs where two
guards are required on the same machine? Does this result in the
possibility of two violations? At this point, it would seem that the
Secretary must heed the criteria that is used by the Review Commis-
sion in determining the reasonableness of a civil penalty. He must
look at the "gravity of the violation.'' 1 1 Each separate violation of
a standard can be alleged separately. But due consideration of serious-
ness has to be considered in assessing the proposed penalty.
State Jurisdiction
A state agency can assert jurisdiction under state law "over any
occupational safety and health issue to which no standard is in effect
." under the OSH Act. 162 Furthermore, if a state desires to assert
jurisdiction in an area in which the Secretary has promulgated
standards, it must submit a plan to the Secretary.163 This plan must
guarantee that the state will enforce standards "at least as effective"
as the federal standards. 164 In addition, the investigative, 65 enforce-
ment,166 and pena 1 67 provisions of the state plan must be as compre-
hensive as those of the federal plan.
Although the overwhelming majority of states have submitted
safety and health plans for approval to the Secretary,168 a major
15829 U.S.C.A. § 653(b)(2) (Supp. 1971).
15929 U.S.C.A. § 666(a) to (d) (Supp. 1971). It is noteworthy that Omo REV. COnE ANN.
§ 4101.16 (Page 1965) provides that: Every day during which any person or corpora-
tion, or any officer, agent, or employee thereof fails to observe and comply with any
order of the department of industrial commission, or to perform any duty enjoined by
... the Revised Code, constitutes a separate violation of such order or section.
16029 CFR §§ 1910.211-222.
16129 U.S.C.A. § 666(j) (Supp. 1971) provides that: The Commission shall have author-
ity to assess all civil penalties provided in this section, giving due consideration to the
appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of the employer
being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the
history of previous violations.
162 29 U.S.C.A. § 667 (Supp. 1971) ; See generally 29 CFR § 1901.
16329 U.S.C.A. § 667(b)(h) (Supp. 1971).
16429 U.S.C.A. § 667(c)(2) (Supp. 1971).
16529 U.S.C.A. § 667(c) (3) (Supp. 1971.
16629 U.S.C.A. § 667(c) (4) (Supp. 1971).
167 Id.




problem still remains. Where there is no approved state plan covering
an issue, is the state precluded from asserting enforcement jurisdiction
over that issue? We know that if there is no federal standard, the
state can assert jurisdiction. But does this mean that the existence
of a federal standard precludes even concurrent jurisdiction by the
state?
Federal intrusion into areas where state legislation was involved
has occurred before. In Pennsylvania v. Nelson,16 9 the Supreme Court
considered the preemption of a state law by a federal law. Here the
federal government had enacted legislation for the control of seditious
activity. Pennsylvania sought to enforce its own legislation dealing
with the same subject. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the ma-
jority, held that the federal legislation had superseded the state law.170
His analysis utilized several criteria in looking at the federal
legislative scheme. He first asked whether the scheme of federal
regulation was so pervasive as to make the inference that Congress
left no room for the states to supplement it.' 71 As we have seen, the
applicability of the OSH Act is as broad as permitted by the inter-
state commerce clause. The federal government now has the respon-
sibility to promulgate occupational safety and health standards that
control activities of employers in the nation in great detail and degree.
Although a role for the individual states is recognized in the Act, it
is only permitted to the extent that they may "develop plans in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Act."'1 72 During the congressional
hearings, it became clear that prior state conduct in this area had
been, at best, disappointing, and, at worst, shocking. It is apparent
that the federal government intended to attack this problem with new
weapons of broad applicability.
Chief Justice Warren also asked whether the federal legislation
is in a field in which the federal interest is so dominant as to preclude
state legislation in the same field. Congress has determined that in
the vital area of human lives occupational safety and health has
become as large a problem as the questions of war and peace. Senator
Williams has pointed out that more Americans have died as a result
of industrial incidents than have died in Vietnam. 73 In addition, these
problems have become of national magnitude and concern. Occupa-
tional safety and health in a manner similar to labor-management
relations in earlier years will become an area of increased federal
concern in the future.
He also considered whether continued enforcement of the state
laws would create possible conflicts with the effective administration
169 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 530 U.S. 497 (1956).
170 Id. at 499.
171 Id. at 502.
17229 U.S.C.A. § 651(b)(11) (Supp. 1971).
178 SOMERS AND SOMERS, supra note 3.
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of the federal legislation. 174 Two problems must be considered here.
First, enforcement of the state regulatory scheme might conceivably
subject the employer to dual punishment. Second, those standards
promulgated by the Secretary may be similar to those used by the
state agencies. Concurrent state enforcement would permit a separate
and probably less strict interpretation of these standards.
It seems, therefore, that:
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law
* . . It went on to confide primary interpretation and application
of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and
prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint,
and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief
pending a final administrative order.175
Furthermore, there is no doubt that Congress intended to erect
a broad federal scheme for the protection of all employees. Conse-
quently, the courts should interpret this scheme of legislation as
preempting state activity in that area.
Conclusion
The OSH Act is a direct result of many decades of neglect by the
states in the field of industrial safety and health. Their legislation
and industrial safety commissions have largely failed to stem the
increasing tide of death and injuries that occur daily throughout
the nation. It was hoped that as a result of this new law this fatal
tide would be reversed. Safety conditions in workplaces will be in-
vestigated, safety and health regulations promulgated, and violators
penalized. But similar federal law in the field of mining has failed
to substantially decrease fatalities and injuries. This is in large part
because the agencies responsible for the enforcement of those laws have
failed to live up to the degree of activity and aggressiveness expected
of them by Congress. The future of the OSH Act and industrial safety
in the United States now lies with the Department of Labor and the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Too many prior
state and federal laws have failed because of inadequate enforcement.
Hopefully this will not occur with the OSH Act.
174 Pennsylvania v, Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 507 (1956).
175 Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; See id., at 490-491: A multiplic-
ity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible
or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law.
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